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Explaining Miracles:
Third Ways and Work and Welfare
HANS KEMAN
The emergence of the Dutch miracle – often seen as a result of the
famous Polder model – has not only resulted in drastic changes as
regards the labour market policy, but also in a performance that is
considered superior to most other OECD economies. In addition, it is
often suggested that this development may well be considered a
prototype of the Third Way politics of contemporary social democracy.
Both views are scrutinised and discussed by means of a cross-national
and cross-time analysis of 19 liberal democracies within the OECD
world. The comparative analysis of the labour market performance,
also by means of demographic categories, demonstrates that the
performance of the Dutch labour market is neither outstanding nor
exceptional. It appears mainly to have been caused by the growth of
part-time labour. Hence, one may well doubt whether a Dutch miracle
exists at all. The analysis also demonstrates that the Dutch labour
market performance is neither optimal nor beneficial to all
concerned. Finally, it is observed that the social democratic Third
Way turns out to be a trade-off in the Netherlands: welfare is
becoming less generous and work comes first. 
Since the 1980s socio-economic policy-making in most West European
countries has been changing. Governments tend to pursue policies that aim
at welfare state retrenchment.1 In addition neo-liberalist ideas consider
traditional policy instruments like public intervention by means of
subsidies, government employment and state ownership no longer effective
in a global economy. In this perspective, governments appear as prisoners
of a harsh global economic environment in which generous social models
are no longer sustainable. In addition, the electoral success during the 1980s
of parties favouring neo-liberal policies reinforced these developments.2
Similarly, the impact of European integration, and particularly the
introduction of the monetary union, has also severely constrained the room
for manoeuvre of European governments, particularly after 1992.3 A final
moral blow to the extant ideas of state-induced socio-economic policy-
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making was the collapse of the Soviet regime, which undermined the
ideology of economic planning and interventionism by means of public
goods. The ‘winning team’ clearly became capitalism and democracy.
From this perspective the development of traditional social democracy
towards the so-called Third Way ideology is particularly important. This set
of ideas can be summarised as the abandonment of a generous welfare state
with a high degree of state intervention in favour of a social investment state
favouring work and market regulation. The Third Way challenges tradional
social democratic policy views. It is argued that increases in social
expenditure will not automatically lead to a reduction in socio-economic
inequality. Instead, social justice became a synonym of more spending.4 The
traditional welfare state, rooted primarily in the logic of industrial
modernity, has proved too inflexible in the face of post-industrial problems.
The existing welfare programmes no longer seem to meet the extant
individual needs and social challenges of a heterogeneous society at the end
of the twentieth century.5 Conversely, in terms of Third Way democratic
socialism, social justice will no longer be achieved by an ex-post reduction
of socio-economic inequalities, but by providing equality of opportunities:
‘employability’ is the new catch-word. Third Way policies are based upon
the idea to move from welfare to work. The access to employment should be
facilitated through the provision of active labour market policies (for
example, focusing on education and reintegration), thereby establishing
equality of opportunity, and should avoid too much state-financed
employment. Welfare in a ‘social investment state’ presupposes a correct
balance between incentives, opportunities and obligations for its citizens:
the assertion of no rights without responsibilities. In fact, the traditional
welfare state hinders the responsibility of citizens to participate in and
benefit from this learning process.6
This agenda regarding what we can call the ‘neo-liberalisation of the
Left’ is now prominent in most West European countries in the OECD
world. However, for all the claims to novelty and originality, it is worth
recalling those similar ideas and policy initiatives that preceded this shift.
First, the New Zealand experiment in the 1980s was applauded by OECD
experts.7 And, second, early 1990s Netherlands, where the path of recovery
from the ‘Dutch disease’ also won praise from the OECD.8 Yet, as the
OECD analysis of the Netherlands went on to point out, this positive
development did not solve all problems: first, that of the unequal
distribution of access to the labour market in terms of demographic groups
(like women and youth); second, the fact that a large part of the unemployed
were made redundant by means of disability programmes and early
retirement schemes.9 Both factors negatively influenced the active/inactive
ratio (that is, those working/not working, which include also those under 16
116 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
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and over 65), which in turn would imply that the generous levels of social
security could not be afforded. This situation has become known as the
‘Dutch disease’.10
The ‘Dutch disease’ is considered the result of a fast growing welfare
state where the number of beneficiaries have outgrown the necessary means
of state revenues (like taxes, the sale of natural gas and so on). Due to the
worldwide stagflation crisis – no trade-off between inflation pressure and
employment growth under conditions of sluggish economic growth, a
situation that worsened in the 1970s and 1980s – the level of unemployment
in the Netherlands rose to a higher level than ever before. This created a
huge public deficit, one that was at least partially due to increasing
expenditures on social security benefits, and to related measures to combat
unemployment and fewer revenues. The ‘standard operating procedures’ to
remedy these negative effects did not pay off: higher taxation did not
decrease the budget deficit, wage moderation did not create sufficient jobs,
and cuts in the welfare expenditures proved politically unfeasible or hardly
effective. In part this development is considered a consequence of the
working of Dutch corporatism, on the one hand, and the behaviour of
centre-right government coalitions, on the other. For, so the argument goes,
government and the organised interests had ‘captured’ each other and this
induced political stalemates and policy rigidity: the ‘Dutch disease’.11
The road to recovery has been a long one. According to most observers
it all began with the famous ‘Wassenaar Accord’.12 This agreement meant
that the trade unions voluntarily accepted wage restraint in return for active
labour market policy measures. Furthermore, there was an understanding
that the extant levels and duration of social security benefits would remain
by and large in place. Within this context the cure had to be implemented
with the help of government. Wage moderation and more active labour
market policies did indeed help to keep the ‘job machine’ going.
Furthermore, a reorganisation of the tax regulations opened up possibilities
for women to find work and for young people to find (mainly) part-time
jobs (without losing social security benefits, thus avoiding the ‘poverty
trap’). Finally, by restructuring the fiscal balance and striving for
deregulation and privatisation, the ‘market’ became the cornerstone of
socio-economic policy formation in the Netherlands. The cure, however,
was not yet complete, since other elements like state debt and budget
deficits were hard to overcome. On the one hand, this had to do with the
‘truce’ on welfare benefits and, on the other, with the paradox of investing
in the future while tax revenues were still below par.
In fact, the path from ‘disease’ to ‘miracle’ in the Netherlands has been
less smooth and miraculous than is claimed by many.13 The core of the
Dutch miracle has been the development of a ‘job machine’ that should be
117THIRD WAYS AND WORK AND WELFARE
262wep06.qxd  16/04/03  11:12  Page 117
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
11
:0
3 
1 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
capable of offsetting the low I/A ratio, thereby reducing the ‘passive’ labour
market expenditures.14 At the same time, however, ‘broad unemployment’15
remained quite high in the Netherlands: in 1979 the level was 18.6 per cent
and in 1999 it was still 19.1 per cent.16 Finally, it was not until the mid-1990s
that the budgetary problems were solved (which was by and large an effect
of the EMU criteria introduced in 199217).
What is considered by many as the ‘Dutch miracle’ can be seen therefore
– at least in part – as the result of international economic circumstances and
EU regulations. Nevertheless, political changes in the Netherlands during
the 1990s did also allow for a new ‘structure induced equilibrium’ in terms
of government composition: the so-called ‘purple coalition’ – an alliance
between the social democrats (PvdA) and the progressive (D66) and
conservative (VVD) liberals. In retrospective, so it appears, it was this
‘coincidence’ of political and economic developments that led to a Third
Way approach to socio-economic policy-making avant la lettre. However,
the Dutch miracle has not been a real recovery and did not concern a
deliberate change of ideas amongst Dutch social democrats. Added to this,
it appears that the effects of curing the Dutch disease were rather a blessing
in disguise: broad unemployment levels were not reduced, whereas the
levels of welfare benefits were. Finally, there has not been a fair
redistribution of ‘work and welfare’ across demographic segments of the
labour force. Why then, one may ask, has there been so much international
attention given to this Dutch way of socio-economic policy-making and to
the ‘Dutch miracle’? 
The answer is – on the surface – that the socio-economic performance of
the Netherlands is quite good compared with many other West European
economies. Second, the transformation appears substantial, in that the
Netherlands has apparently been able to ‘cure’ the supposed ‘Dutch disease’
from which it suffered since the mid-1970s. Thirdly, and perhaps most
importantly, the policy changes introduced by the purple coalition in 1994
were not only supported by organised capital and labour, but seem also to
have paid off. Hence, certain policy changes regarding the reorganisation of
the labour market (the ‘job machine’) as well as of the social security
system (restricted access and lower levels) could take place without high
levels of social unrest and stark political opposition.
In this sense, it is considered a success story because – according to
many commentators in the Netherlands and abroad – the performance of the
Dutch economy represents a miraculous recovery, particularly since it was
produced by a new ‘lib-lab’ coalition led by a social democratic Prime
Minister with the help of a corporatist strategy. This strategy, a powerful
combination of left and right in government with parallel representation in
the system of industrial relations, has often been called the ‘Polder model’.
118 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
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Moreover, and from this, many infer the argument that political change in
the Netherlands is directly associated with policy change, and this in turn
echoes the ideas of the Third Way. The real question is, however, whether
this view can be maintained in the face of empirical evidence and
comparative data analysis. 
The questions this article seek to address are therefore: to what extent is
the recovery and performance of the Dutch labour market – considered
comparatively rather than as a single case – a miraculous achievement? Is
the Dutch political-institutional framework of tri-partite socio-economic
policy formation – the Polder model – and the related development of
labour market policy markedly different from other OECD countries,
especially in those West European nations that have a more or less similar
institutional design; in other words: do ‘national’ modes of decision-making
and policy-concertation matter within a globalising world?18
If the Dutch way is a miraculous development within a unique
institutional setting, then of course it follows that the highly acclaimed
Polder model will not be easy for others to follow. Alternatively, if the
second question can be answered positively and the institutional
arrangements elsewhere can indeed be considered equi-functional, then the
Polder model could indeed serve as an example for adherents to the Third
Way. To push this point further: can the alleged relation between the Polder
model and the Dutch miracle be considered a prototype of what is presently
labelled the Third Way of social democracy?
A comparative analysis of labour market policy-making and the related
performance from 1990 till 2000 will attempt to answer these questions.
This involves a comparison between 19 OECD countries (see Table 1 for
the countries included), focusing on the impact of governmental policy-
making, on the one hand, and the role of corporatist interest intermediation,
on the other. Both institutional factors are considered central for assessing
the existence and working of the Polder model as well as the acclaimed
Dutch miracle. 
THE DUTCH LABOUR MARKET AND WELFARE STATISM 
As outlined above, the Netherlands appeared to be a victim of a ‘happy’
blend of a highly developed welfare state and a highly internationalised
economy during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Yet, equally important has
been the changing face of the Dutch labour market since the 1970s. This
change concerns, first of all, female participation on the labour market: this
rose from 31.7 per cent in 1975 to 57.3 per cent in 1995. Although
comparatively speaking still low (the OECD average was 67.8 per cent in
1995), the growth of female labour participation required an increase in job
119THIRD WAYS AND WORK AND WELFARE
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supply. At the same time youth unemployment reached in the early 1990s a
higher level than ever before whereas the active/inactive ratio was the
second lowest of the OECD world (the Netherlands: 57 per cent; OECD: 68
per cent). This in effect implied that the demand for labour in the
Netherlands, in particular from the young and females, has risen more than
the supply. In addition, in terms of total outlays and transfer payments (to
households) the Netherlands was among the big spenders within the OECD
world.19 This development, in combination with a very open economy (only
Belgium and Ireland are more vulnerable than the Dutch economy in this
respect), made the Netherlands less attractive for foreign capital. Hence, the
Dutch disease was in part due to the fact that the public economy was
crowding out market incentives, and in part because – given the
international stagflation crisis – there was precious little room for macro-
economic adjustments.20 In short, in political-economic terms the Dutch
disease concerned the situation in which welfare appeared to have come
before work, and was conducive to expensive and unsustainable public
expenditures. In the words of Esping-Andersen,21 ‘The Netherlands [was] a
pathology of a conservative welfare state, in which the de-commodification
of labour (i.e. living independent from labour market participation) has
crowded out the incentives for job-creation’. 
Yet, and seemingly remarkably quickly, this apparent disease was cured.
How did this happen and how did the so-called Dutch miracle come about?
The literature suggests that three factors in particular were involved: First,
the existence of institutional arrangements which were conducive to wage
moderation and to policy concertation between the ‘social partners’ (capital
and labour) and the state. In other words, corporatism helped to bring about
a turnaround in policy-making.22 Second, the introduction of a conservative
fiscal policy regarding the public economy and the reorganisation of public
eligibility for welfare benefits and other public goods were conducive to
achieving ‘reasonable’ compromises as regards macro-economic policy
formation.23 Third, the introduction of active labour market policies
(relaxing legal rigidities and wage protection) helped, and in particular the
introduction of targeted employment programmes.24 In addition to wage
moderation, the recommodification of labour25 and the creation of labour
supply by means of new public regulations are considered the crucial
political decisions that eventually led to a cure. 
All this is well and good, of course, and it sounds perfectly plausible.
But what exactly is being explained by this literature? In fact, as is
demonstrated below, the actual performance of the Dutch labour market has
not proved much better than that in many other OECD countries.26
In other words, and contrary to many of the prevailing accounts, it can
be contended, first, that the Dutch institutional framework relevant for this
120 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
262wep06.qxd  16/04/03  11:12  Page 120
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
 A
ms
te
rd
am
] 
At
: 
11
:0
3 
1 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
development – corporatism and tri-partite consultation – is neither unique
nor very different from that developed in other democracies; and, second,
that shifts in socio-economic policy-formation in the Netherlands have not
been dramatic over time nor are they dramatic in comparison with examples
in other West European countries; and, third, that the performance of the
Dutch political economy is actually quite comparable to that of other OECD
economies but that the economy has, amongst other things, strongly
benefited from a favourable international economic climate in recent years.
In short, the policy performance is not merely the result of particular
political craftsmanship but is also the result of learning by trial and error.
Rather than speaking of a miracle or of a unique Polder model it is therefore
more appropriate to consider the Dutch labour market performance during
the 1990s as a recovery that was quicker than expected and is now in line
with the majority of West European economies. This development will be
investigated below in order to set the scene for the ensuing comparative
analysis of the Dutch political economy. But before presenting the
comparative analysis underpinning doubts about the Dutch miracle, the
article first describes the changes that have taken place on the labour market
in the OECD world since 1990. For these developments are vital for
understanding the emerging ‘job machine’ in the Netherlands.
THE CHANGING FACE OF THE LABOUR MARKET
The labour market is, to put it simply, the place where supply (of work)
meets demand (for work). In this section we focus firstly on those who are
eligible for jobs (between 16 and 64 years), those who are unemployed (not
having a job, but looking for), and the number of jobs available (the supply).
Between 1990 and 2000 the total labour force within the OECD world
increased on average by 1.0 per cent. The strongest growth of people
eligible for a job can be found in Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands.
Unemployment rates remained the same with only 0.3 change across the
OECD – in the Netherlands, however, decreasing with -3.4 per cent, as in
Spain (-3.8 per cent) and Denmark (-4.2 per cent) – whereas the supply of
work increased slightly with 1.0 per cent on average. Here, the Netherlands
is quite an outlier, in that between 1990 and 2000 there has been job growth
of some 9.8 per cent. This was certainly a remarkable achievement from a
comparative perspective (note also the cases of Belgium, Ireland and
Norway). The achievement is at least partly attributable to another salient
feature of change in the development of the Dutch labour population – the
steep increase in female labour participation (by 32.6 per cent between 1975
and 2000), and a simultaneous increase in female part-time labour (growing
by 13.8 per cent over the same period).27 Although this growth of jobs,
121THIRD WAYS AND WORK AND WELFARE
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partly part time, reduced the rise in unemployment,28 the rate of
unemployment among the ‘newcomers’ (youth) and the relative
‘latecomers’ (female) did not go down, but kept on growing. However, this
is not the complete story regarding the labour market. We must also take
into account who is in need of jobs, and where the jobs are supplied.
Between 1975 and 2000 the rate of unemployment among young people
and women rose roughly twice as much and ended up respectively three and
two times higher than for normal male workers. Although the supply of jobs
stagnated in most OECD countries, this was not the case in the Netherlands.
However, at the same time the demand for a job (unemployment and
eligibility) grew in the Netherlands, in particular amongst women and
young people. Hence, although the job growth in the Netherlands is indeed
above the OECD and EU averages, it is equally true that its distribution
across the demographic segments is quite skewed in favour of adults (that
is, over 23 years old), and in particular in favour of males. This is partly a
social and cultural inheritance of the past,29 since it used to be
122 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
TABLE 1
INDICATORS OF THE LABOUR MARKET (1990–2000)
COUNTRY TLabF- TLabF- Empop- Empop- Unem- Unem- Ptal- Ptall-
level change level change level change level change
Australia 73.6 0.6 68.2 0.3 7.2 –1.4 26.1 3.5
Austria 71.6 0.1 68.2 –0.2 5.3 0.5 12.3 1.4
Belgium 64.6 7.9 58.9 4.8 9.0 0.4 19.9 5.7
Canada 75.9 –0.7 70.1 –0.2 7.6 –1.8 18.5 1.5
Denmark 80.6 –1.8 76.5 1.1 5.5 –4.2 15.3 –3.9
Finland 73.6 –3.0 66.0 –8.1 10.2 0.3 9.9 2.4
France 67.8 1.8 59.8 –0.1 11.1 –7.7 14.7 2.5
Germany 71.2 2.8 64.9 0.8 9.0 1.4 17.1 3.7
Greece 62.5 3.4 55.6 0.8 10.7 2.1 9.0 2.3
Ireland 66.3 6.1 62.5 10.2 5.5 –9.0 18.3 8.5
Italy 59.6 –0.2 52.5 –1.4 11.5 1.1 11.8 3.0
Netherlands 73.6 7.4 70.9 9.8 3.2 –3.4 30.4 2.2
Norway 80.6 3.5 78.0 4.9 3.2 –1.5 20.7 0.5
Portugal 70.6 –0.3 67.3 –0.2 4.4 –1.6 9.3 2.5
Spain 63.9 3.0 53.8 2.7 15.9 –3.8 7.9 3.3
Sweden 78.5 –6.1 72.9 –10.2 5.6 0.6 14.5 0.0
Switzerland 82.2 1.1 79.9 0.3 3.0 –0.9 24.8 2.7
GB 76.3 –1.5 71.7 –0.7 5.9 –0.3 23.0 2.9
US 77.2 0.7 73.9 1.7 4.2 –0.3 13.3 –0.5
EU average 69.0 1.7 62.6 1.0 9.2 –0.8 16.4 3.1
OECD average 70.4 1.0 65.9 0.7 6.6 0.3 15.8 1.5
Notes: TLabF = Total Labour Force/population; Empop = Employment/pop; Unem =
Unemployment/TLabF; PT = Part Time Jobs/TLabF. All values are %; Level = 2000;
Change = First differences. 
Sources: OECD Labour Force Statistics 2000 (Paris: OECD 2002).
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predominantly the male population which looked for a job in the
Netherlands. This is no longer the case, however, for women have
increasingly entered the job market. This, in turn, has been partly born of
necessity, and the need to supplement the family income, which is, of
course, also related to welfare retrenchment.30 Regarding the younger
working population the picture is more mixed: in most countries the
proportion of younger people eligible for a job decreases (inter alia due to
an ‘education permanente’) but still the rate of unemployment amongst
younger people has increased (sometimes dramatically, like in Belgium,
Finland, France, Greece, Italy and Spain). Yet, whatever way one looks at
the figures reported in Table 2, it is quite obvious that adult men – and also
to some extent adult women – were better off in terms of employment
opportunities during the 1990s, while it is mainly younger people who have
more problems. Although less dramatic, this situation also occurs in
the Netherlands. 
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TABLE 2
PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT ACROSS
DEMOGRAPHIC CATEGORIES (2000)
Country Une- Un- Fem- Fem- Empop- Empop- Empop- Empop
Men MenY Un UnY M YM W YW
Australia 5.7 14.5 5.6 13.2 85.3 62.0 65.6 59.6
Austria 4.5 5.5 4.6 6.4 89.6 59.2 72.8 50.7
Belgium 6.1 22.7 9.0 22.4 86.2 27.5 66.4 23.4
Canada 6.5 15.3 6.3 12.6 85.1 55.4 73.2 53.9
Denmark 3.7 9.5 4.9 10.5 89.3 69.5 79.4 62.8
Finland 7.9 21.0 9.0 22.2 83.4 39.3 77.1 38.2
France 9.0 24.2 12.6 29.7 85.7 24.3 68.5 17.3
Germany 7.3 9.1 8.7 7.7 87.0 50.7 69.2 42.8
Greece 5.7 21.4 13.9 39.3 89.0 34.2 51.6 22.2
Ireland 5.7 8.6 4.8 8.3 86.4 49.7 60.0 42.9
Italy 6.9 28.6 13.6 38.3 84.3 30.3 49.5 20.8
Netherlands 2.1 6.6 4.1 8.2 91.5 62.9 69.4 62.5
Norway 2.6 9.6 2.2 9.5 89.4 60.2 81.4 55.2
Portugal 3.4 7.0 4.6 10.8 89.8 47.6 72.1 38.7
Spain 9.2 21.7 21.0 37.3 84.2 41.3 47.6 26.2
Sweden 6.5 14.8 5.9 13.6 84.5 44.8 80.6 42.8
Switzerland 2.2 5.6 3.2 5.7 95.1 64.1 75.1 65.4
GB 5.4 14.1 4.3 10.2 86.7 63.0 72.6 58.5
US 3.0 10.3 3.4 9.5 89.0 61.0 74.1 57.0
EU average 6.9 16.1 9.8 18.6 86.3 43.4 64.7 35.5
OECD average 4.9 11.7 6.1 11.9 88.5 51.1 63.6 42.3
Notes: Unemen = Unemployed Male; UnemenY = Unemployed young men; FemunY =
Unemployed young women; Empop = Employed people - M = Male - W = Women - Y
= Young. All values are %. 
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics 2000 (Paris: OECD 2002).
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The reasons for the cross-national variation in youth unemployment are
difficult to trace. To some extent it is dependent on national factors like
rising school age, third level education, protective legislation, and so on.
But the major factor – as we shall see later – is the development of the
general levels of demand and supply of labour. These levels appear to affect
‘newcomers’ most negatively on the labour market (an indication of this
trend is, for instance, that youth employment rates are lower than the youth
labour force). Finally, it can also be seen from Table 2 that the pattern of
demand for work in the Netherlands across most demographic categories is
different from the EU and OECD averages in the 1990s. Yet these
differences are not exceptional from a cross-national perspective. On the
contrary, countries like Austria, Denmark, Germany, Portugal, Switzerland
and the USA show a similar performance. If one could speak of a Dutch
miracle, it would perhaps concern the quite successful shift in sectoral
employment from industrial employment toward the service sector-oriented
labour market. For that is where the jobs appear to be.
As is well known, there has been a general shift in the labour market
across economic sectors: between 1975 and 1995 employment in the
agrarian and industrial sectors grew smaller and smaller everywhere. In the
OECD world the average changes in the agrarian sector amounted to a fall
of 6.1 per cent (Netherlands: -1.8 per cent) and to a fall of 8.2 per cent in
the industrial sector (Netherlands: -9.3 per cent), whereas the service sector
has grown by an average of 14.8 per cent (Netherlands: 13.1 per cent).
Although these figures suggest a balanced situation, it goes almost without
saying that not all those who leave one sector automatically enter the service
sector. In the Netherlands the surplus has been 2.0 per cent and is one of the
factors why a miracle could be perceived.31 In many other countries the
shifts across sectors has been much larger and the net result more often
positive – but not in Belgium, Germany, Portugal, the UK and the US.
Hence, most countries within Europe have been able to cope admirably with
the structural changes within the labour market. Actually it is almost a
miracle that the negative sums between the sectors are relatively low in
most countries. Apparently the whole OECD world has been able to
transform itself by means of flexible adjustment. However, one ought to
bear in mind that it was during the 1990s that the world economy was
growing and that especially trade and services became a boom industry.
In sum, the changing face of the labour market in most OECD countries
after 1975 concerns (a) a higher influx of female and young job seekers and
fewer ‘older’ workers; (b) shifts between productive sectors that are mainly
to the advantage of the service sector; and (c) higher overall rates of labour
market participation, in particular by means of part-time jobs. All this also
holds true for the Dutch economy, and hence the changes in the labour
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market are neither unique nor different in the Netherlands. This still leaves
the question of whether the trajectory from ‘disease’ to ‘miracle’ has been
more successful in the Netherlands than elsewhere among the OECD
economies. If this is indeed the case, it would also imply a specific way of
‘coping with the crisis’ that is significantly better and that would justify the
term ‘Dutch miracle’. The secret would then be, according to most
commentators, that this miracle is achieved by means of a special
institutional arrangement, the so-called Polder model, which has been so
highly acclaimed elsewhere. 
THE DUTCH MIX OF CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY AND CORPORATISM:
THE POLDER MODEL
The Polder model is, in fact, a combination of institutional features that are
known under the labels of ‘consensus democracy’ and ‘corporatism’. There
is little disagreement about the idea that both institutional arrangements are
typical of the Dutch political system.32 There is some disagreement,
however, about the extent to which both systems of institutionalised interest
intermediation are inter-related and about how they affect public policy
formation and the subsequent process of policy implementation.33
According to one school of thought, corporatism is inherent in
consociationalism (which is the forerunner of consensus democracy) and is
typical for what is seen as the Polder model. Another school of thought sees
both systems as interdependent, but whether or not they are more effective
as a combined ‘problem-solving’ style of decision-making is subject to
political and economic circumstances.34
Consensus politics and corporatist practices are institutional
arrangements which may well reinforce policy co-ordination and
concertation. Corporatism is an institutional arrangement that allows for
policy concertation: that is, all the relevant participants have an influence on
the policy direction that is chosen and all are committed to co-operate by
implementing public policies designed to remedy a stagnating macro-
economic performance. In this view, the Dutch miracle can in part be
considered the result of corporatist decision-making and subsequent policy
implementation.35 This position is different from the consensus democracy
model developed by Arend Lijphrt, however. Here the formal rules of the
political game can and are used to avoid the exclusion of minorities (in
particular in multi-party systems by means of negative or veto-coalitions).
Following Lijphart, these rules are designed for and used to prevent simple
majorities from exercising power unilaterally: power sharing is the name of
the game, and it is believed to be conducive to optimal pay-offs for all
participants. Consensus democracy, a typical feature of the Dutch political
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system, is then considered the second dimension of the Polder model. In
particular, policy consensus is crucial since only parliamentary government
is in a position to enforce the results of corporatist agreements by means of
public regulation, if not enforcement. Hence, this argument implies that
features of corporatism and consensus democracy are considered crucial
institutional arrangements that enhance policy co-ordination and
concertation and are seen as essential for achieving a well functioning
labour market in a mixed economy. 
From Table 3 it is clear that the Netherlands belongs to those stronger
cases where consensus politics and corporatism go hand in hand. The index
of ‘institutional co-operation’ which is a combination of features
representing Lijphart’s consensus democracy, on the one hand, and the
presence of corporatist intermediation, on the other, shows that Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland also belong to
this category. It should be noted that the position of the Netherlands has
changed over time: since 1982 – after the famous Wassenaar Accord36 – the
system of collective bargaining has become decentralised, albeit still within
a highly co-ordinated system. In addition, future agreements were to aim at
wage moderation and suspending cost-of-living adjustments regarding
social security benefits. Finally, wage bargaining would from then on take
place within the framework of the public economy, that is, with a guiding
role for government. 
Another important political development in the Netherlands has been the
so-called purple coalition government (1994–2002), which was the first
government to be formed since 1917 without the Christian Democratic
party, and which signified a shift of power towards the liberals (VVD and
D66) and Social Democrats (PvdA, who also has held the premiership).
This particular coalition, so it is argued, made it possible to introduce policy
changes – not in the least in the socio-economic sector. Hence, for the first
time in Dutch history the main actors in the corporatist arena (employers’
and employee’s organisations) and the parliamentary arena (parties of the
left and right) dominated the political scene with parallel and
complementary socio-economic agendas: parallel in the sense that both
parties remain self-interested but do not compete; complementary in the
sense that the parties in government have preferences that are overlapping.
The importance of this new situation is in the idea that collaboration
between adversarial actors is not only possible but also more efficient in
terms of decision-making. Compromises tend to be ‘bargains’ rather than
pay-offs with the help of public resources. In other words: negative sum or
sub-optimal outcomes could be avoided.37 It is this special mix of societal
corporatism and secularised consensus politics that is characteristic of the
Polder model, and it is this which also brings us back to the main question:
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what type of socio-economic policy has been made in the polder and has it
been miraculous in terms of labour market performance?
THE POLDER MODEL AT WORK: LABOUR MARKET POLICY-MAKING 
The literature identifies many types of policy instruments that are involved
in the structuring of the labour market. First, there are passive and active
instruments:38 passive instruments deal with the consequences of a
malfunctioning labour market, for example by means of unemployment
benefits and transfer payments to households (de-commodification); active
instruments involve measures to direct demand and to develop the supply of
labour, for example by schooling and training, labour exchange offices, and
so on (re-commodification). The passive type is seen as a temporary measure
which – if and when the economy slows down – is supposed to prevent the
economy as a whole from entering a downward spiral of under-demand and
over-unemployment (that is, Keynesian demand-side economics). The active
type is intended to support stronger segments of economic activity, on the
one hand, and to develop flexible demand for labour, on the other hand (that
is, supply-side economics). Promoting active and reducing passive
instruments, as well as a limited expansion of the public sector, are
considered to contribute to a well-functioning labour market.39 The Dutch
miracle is then the outcome of a well-chosen application of these instruments
– the adequate policy-mix. This, so the argument goes, has been possible in
the Netherlands because consensual policy-making and corporatist policy
concertation have prevailed since the 1980s (since the Wassenaar Accord,
1982) and have produced an adequate policy mix during the 1990s
(especially by the purple coalition government). 
Table 3 shows first of all that indeed the Netherlands is among those
polities where institutional co-operation prevails (0.79; the average value
for the EU is 0.32 and for the OECD -0.11). As we noted, this situation
changed in the early 1990s and is considered a part of the development
toward the Polder model. In terms of policy-making the Netherlands
belongs to the leaders among the OECD countries as regards expenditures
on labour market policies and is around the EU average in terms of the size
of its public sector and the proportion spent on welfare benefits. At the same
time it should be noted that both the size of the public sector and cash
benefits from the welfare state are considerably lower than they were. In
fact, only Ireland and the Netherlands reduced their welfare-related
expenditures in such a drastic fashion: between 1984 and 1997 the total sum
of welfare-related cash benefits fell by 3.7 per cent in Ireland and by 5.4 per
cent in the Netherlands. However, this does not apply to policy efforts on
the labour market, where much of the expenditures still remain within the
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category of the passive policy type. The active labour market policy efforts
in 1999, on the other hand, are comparable to those in Denmark and
Sweden. It seems that the Dutch miracle is not due to measures commonly
seen as Third Way democratic socialism but rather results from reducing the
social security safety net (that is, the cash benefits to households). This
retrenchment of the Dutch welfare state is not counteracted by means of a
drastic growth of active labour market policy expenditures in the
Netherlands. In actual fact the Dutch growth rate is not more than half of the
European average (see Table 3). All in all, it appears that the Netherlands
128 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
TABLE 3
IINDICATORS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN
OECD POLITIES (1990–2000)
Country Institu- Comple- Lab- Lab- Active- Active- Passive- Passive-
tional xion Market Market LabM LabM LabM LabM
Co-oper- Govern- policy- policy- policy- policy- policy- policy-
2000 75–2000 2000 75–2000 2000 75–2000
Australia –0.66 –3.29 1.61 0.96 0.49 0.38 1.12 0.58
Austria 0.88 –0.21 1.72 0.62 0.52 0.11 1.2 0.51
Belgium 0.86 1.73 3.85 0.25 1.34 0.05 2.51 0.20
Canada –1.83 1.17 1.5 0.42 0.51 0.36 0.99 0.06
Denmark 0.70 1.73 4.9 0.63 1.77 1.39 3.12 –0.76
Finland 1.39 –1.75 3.55 3.91 1.22 0.58 2.33 3.33
France –0.80 –0.21 3.13 1.44 1.33 0.95 1.8 0.49
Germany 0.30 –0.78 3.42 2.36 1.3 0.63 2.12 1.73
Greece –0.27 –0.21 0.85 0.38 0.35 0.19 0.5 0.19
Ireland –0.28 –0.78 4.07 1.14 1.66 0.17 2.42 0.97
Italy 0.85 1.73 1.74 0.96 1.1 0.68 0.64 0.28
Netherlands 0.79 0.19 4.61 2.53 1.8 0.28 2.81 2.35
Norway 0.39 0.19 1.29 1.48 0.82 0.74 0.47 0.74
Portugal –0.16 1.73 1.74 1.13 0.85 0.48 0.89 0.65
Spain –0.35 –3.29 2.22 0.92 0.81 0.62 1.41 0.30
Sweden 0.86 –0.21 3.54 3.0 1.84 1.09 1.7 1.91
Switzerland 0.73 –0.78 1.77 1.75 0.7 0.53 1.07 1.22
GB –1.47 1.73 1.19 0.1 0.37 –0.10 0.82 0.20
US –1.77 1.17 0.42 –0.25 0.17 0.04 0.25 –0.29
EU average 0.32 0.09 2.79 1.36 1.39 0.52 1.4 0.81
OECD average –0.11 0.03 2.48 1.24 1.0 0.48 1.48 0.77
Notes: Institutional co-operation and complexion government are based on own computations;
it concerns ordinal variables that are transformed into Z-scores (high scores = more
institutional co-operation and more impact of left-wing parties in government);
LabMarket policy = expenditures on Active and Passive measures re. Labour Market (%
of GDP).
Source: H. Keman (ed.), The Politics of Problem-Solving in Postwar Democracies (London:
Macmillan 1997); P. Pennings, H. Keman and G. Kleinniynhnis, Doing Research in
Political Science (London: Sage 1999); M.G. Schmidt, ‘When Parties Matter’,
European Journal of Political Research 30 (1996), pp.155–83; OECD, Labour Force
Statistics, 2000.
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belongs to those countries now spending more on employment policies and
less on welfare than before. However, this pattern is by no means unique
within the OECD world. Hence, one could conclude that the policy-making
efforts in the Polder model are not that different from elsewhere in the
OECD world, and one can see that there is not a substantial growth in
expenditures on active labour market policies (only 0.28 per cent since
1975, whereas the EU average is 0.52 per cent). So how did the Dutch
miracle then occur?
To what extent have the institutional and political changes in the
Netherlands – such as the different government complexion (the purple
coalition) and the revitalised corporatist system of policy concertation – been
conducive to a miraculous improvement of its labour market performance? To
this end a regression analysis has been performed in which the main factors
mentioned and discussed so far are brought together. The goal is to see
whether the Netherlands fares (much) better than the other countries under
review here, that is, to see if the Dutch developments can be viewed as a
(positive) outlier. In Table 4 a simple model is presented where two conditions
are considered as indicators of the Polder model: first, institutional co-
operation between the social partners (employers’ organisations and trade
union federations) and government, and, second, consensual behaviour
between parties in government and parliament (complexion of government).
The third factor in each model is either efforts relating to labour market
policy-making (passive and active) or the rates of part-time labour (see Table
1). These conditions are assumed to have a positive effect on the level and
change of unemployment (specified for: total unemployment, men only,
women only and youth only; see Table 2). In addition, a second equation is
also computed. In this model the outcome of labour market regulation is
controlled by part-time labour. Most commentators with respect to the Dutch
miracle agree on the idea that this factor has a powerful effect in explaining
the miraculous performance of the Dutch labour market. The test performed
here is then wheether the Netherlands not only performed above average, but
also was positively different from other countries. To be miraculous, a
situation ought also to be unique.
The results of this test to account for the variations in rate of
unemployment across OECD economies are quite straightforward. First, it
can easily be seen that institutional designs favouring co-operation are
indeed relevant. However, this does not imply that such conditions coincide
with a beneficial effect on the rate of unemployment. On the contrary, it is
only when we are dealing with rates of total and male unemployment that
institutional co-operation together with a left-wing complexion of
government appears to result in an above average performance. Complexion
of government is only significant if it concerns male adult workers. Second,
129THIRD WAYS AND WORK AND WELFARE
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labour market policy formation can be an important instrument for
combating unemployment. However, this is a mixed result: it appears
effective for total unemployment and for that of female workers. Yet this
effect is only relevant if part-time jobs are created. This latter aspect – part-
time labour – appears effective for all demographic segments of the labour
market. In other words, in countries where institutional co-operation is
present and active labour market policies are (more likely to be) pursued by
government, the eventual performance in terms of job creation (and thus
less unemployment) strongly coincides with – or is even arrested without
the help of – a rise in part-time labour. This also implies, inter alia, that the
Dutch ‘job machine’ appears able to create more jobs than before, but that
less hours are available for an individual worker to earn an income.
What does the outcome of this analysis mean for the Dutch case? To
answer the question as to whether the Dutch case is miraculous and is (thus)
performing above the average we can look to Table 5, which reports the
residual values of the Netherlands as well as its predicted values (in
comparison with the European mean). The residual value shows whether or
not the Dutch case is indeed exceptionally positive, whereas the predicted
value can be compared with the actual value (that is, the labour market
performance). The closer or higher the actual scores of the Dutch labour
market are to the predicted value, the stronger is the proof that we have a
‘miracle’ on our hands.
The results of Table 5 give us a clear answer to the questions asked with
respect to the exceptional policy-making capabilities of the Netherlands due
130 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
TABLE 4
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND LABOUR MARKET POLICY PERFORMANCE
(1990–2000):  RATES  OF UNEMPLOYMENT (%)
Rate of Unemployment: Total Male Female Youth
Model: (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept                  = 2.71 –0.92 4.12 7.97 3.57 4.73 6.85 4.95
Explained Variance  = 38.1% 10.8% 22.1% 33.3% 29.4% 37.0% 9.7% 17.3%
(adj. R² * 100)
Independent Variables:
Institutional Co-operation .64* .27* –.30 -.21 .47* .20 .36      .32*
Complexion of Government .19 .15 –.41* –.40* –.21 –.23 .03      .01
Labour Market Policy –.75* – –.34 – –.54* – –.17 –
Part Time Labour – –.27 – –.44* – –.53* – –.40*
Note: Concerns OLS-regressions; * = significant at 0.05 level. All values reported are
standardised (Beta-scores). (1) = without Part Time Labour and (2) is without Labour
Market Policy in the equations. 
Sources: See Tables 1–3 for the data used.
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to its Polder model, and the resulting outstanding labour market
performance, the so-called Dutch miracle. As regards the Polder model, or
institutional co-operation, it can be observed that there is an effect on labour
market performance, but not a markedly different one. At the same time the
Dutch performance is not outstanding (except for male labour market
performance). We contend therefore that the occurrence of part-time labour
is the sole factor that closes the gap between the actual and predicted level
of employment. Hence, the Netherlands is not exceptional, nor does it
perform better than many other comparable cases (for example, Belgium,
Denmark, Ireland and Sweden are often in the same league). In short, the
Netherlands looks better than many other countries, but it is certainly not
the best or even a unique performer. This also answers our second question:
is the Dutch labour market performance miraculous? The short answer here
is no. On only two occasions does the actual value (the real outcome)
reported in Table 5 come close to the predicted value: male unemployment
(model 2) and female unemployment (model 2). But in both equations the
so-called miraculous performance is by and large produced by means of
part-time job creation. Hence, it is not a direct result of an active labour
market policy per se, but is rather the effect created by the relaxation of
labour market regulation. Hence, insofar as one can speak of an above
average performance by the Netherlands, this is due to the exceptional
growth of part-time labour, which – almost by definition – improves the
overall scores on labour market performance. And yet this may well imply
a perverse effect: it may means a lower income for many involved, fewer
opportunities for individual career development, and – last but not least – a
negatively association with the development of welfare benefits. In other
131THIRD WAYS AND WORK AND WELFARE
TABLE 5
RESIDUAL AND PREDICTED VALUES OF THE NETHERLANDS:
MODEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
Total Male Female Youth
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Residual Value:
The Netherlands 0.01 0.22 1.90 –0.90 –1.45 0.83 –1.09 0.07
Maximum value 1.84 1.10 1.44 1.35 1.78 1.08 1.71 1.39
Minimum value –1.83 –1.99 –1.90 –1.74 –1.85 –2.66 –1.80 –1.89
European Av. 0.22 0.20 0.58 0.64 0.22 0.28 –0.15 –0.22
Predicted Value:
The Netherlands –1.00 0.65 0.43 –1.70 –0.98 –1.88 0.05 –2.52
European Av. 0.67 0.06 0.26 0.20 0.03 –0.04 0.26 0.34
Actual Value NL –0.69 –1.21 –1.86 –1.12
Note: Computations based on models reported in Table 4: all values are standardised. 
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words, active labour market policy formation that is conducive to part-time
job creation often leads to lower levels of de-commodification, that is,
welfare benefits (Pearsons r = -.48). And, as we already observed, the
Netherlands is the leader of those countries where welfare retrenchment has
taken place during the 1990s. Limited working hours, often implying less
income, seem to have replaced generous welfare benefits.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The Netherlands is different from many of the successful OECD economies
with respect to the growth of part-time jobs, and the comparative reduction
of income transfers. In terms of effects on the labour market performance,
however, one can observe that the Dutch case is not a deviant or exceptional
case, whether positive or negative. Hence, little has genuinely changed in
the Netherlands since the era of the Dutch disease in terms of labour market
performance. The only new feature in the Dutch context is the exceptional
growth of part-time work.40 Together with a moderated system of welfare
eligibility and a diminished level of social security benefits, one may
wonder whether or not the Dutch miracle has created a new disease: namely
less access to the labour market for female and in particular younger people
and, as a consequence, an uneven (re)distribution of income (apparently
favouring male adult employees). It seems that jobs have been traded off
against social welfare in the Netherlands, and that the goal of enhancing the
material well being of all has been sacrificed to the need to cure the (old)
Dutch disease. Where ‘new’ labour market policies have been introduced, it
is with the underlying idea of work instead of welfare, and hence the
acclaimed Polder model has not resulted in a positive sum outcome.
The Dutch experience, as it evolved through the 1990s, resembled much
of what is now labelled as the Third Way of democratic socialism. In this
sense the ‘purple coalition’ of parties in government and the role of
organised interests in the Netherlands also presented an intriguing example
of the ‘new’ direction of social democratic politics in Europe. Yet, with the
benefit of hindsight, the voters rather appear to wish for a proper ‘safety net’
in the future, if and when out of work. This assumption is supported by the
elections of 2002.41 The parties in government lost heavily in 2002,
reflecting a major shift away from the purple coalition and the Third Way.
It seems that work without welfare does not pay off in terms of political
capital, and that the Polder model is not capable of bringing about a miracle
in terms of both work and welfare.
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